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In the continuum of written law, the fair trade acts are of com-
paratively recent origin. In the lifetime of the Florida act there has been
much litigation and controversy. The purpose of this paper is to update
this continuing debate and to outline possible means of finalizing the
status of the Florida Fair Trade Act.
I. THE LEGAL ECONOMICS OF FAIR TRADE
Fair trade laws have been enacted to enable merchants and manu-
facturers to contract with each other to set the prices at which mer-
chandise may be sold. There is little doubt that such fair trade legislation
can have a sizeable impact on consumer prices. If the theory behind
federal antitrust legislation is, at least in part, a lowering of prices for
the consumer,1 Congressional approval of fair trade acts, which are anti-
thetical to antitrust, would seem anomalous. 2 The answer to this ap-
parent paradox is found in our profit motivated economy.
Resale price maintenance is supported by two economic interest
groups: (1) producers or trademark owners, and (2) retailers. Producers
and trademark owners argue that price cutting detracts from the good-
will of their product. They maintain that if their product is advertised
or sold at less than the set retail price, the consumer would refuse to pay
more than the lowered price. As a result, other retailers would have to
lower their prices to compete. The higher overhead of some retailers
would make it unprofitable to handle the product at the lower price, with
the result that the producer would lose his retail outlets. The net result
would be that the owner's and producer's exposure to the public would
be reduced, which may cause a corresponding decline in sales.
Retailers who oppose price cutting argue that it results in harmful
price wars. These businessmen are content to sell at a higher price pro-
vided competitors also sell at the same price or at a higher price. On the
* Member of the Florida Bar and the firm of Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman & Lipoff,
P.A.
1. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2182 (1952).
2. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 45(3) (1964).
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other hand, consumers generally oppose regulation of competition by
fair trade legislation because lower prices are believed to result from un-
fettered competition. Thus, while the net result of fair trade laws is the
prevention of disastrous price cutting and the subsequent destruction of
goodwill, these results are achieved at the expense of the consumer.
II. FAIR TRADE ACTS IN GENERAL
Prior to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, vertical
trade agreements3 which fixed the prices of trademarked goods were
generally considered lawful. 4 Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, how-
ever, such vertical trade agreements constituted an unlawful restraint of
trade.5 Since the Sherman Act was directed only at interstate commerce,
states, beginning with California in 1931,6 began enacting fair trade laws
to legalize vertical trade agreements designed to fix prices in intrastate
commerce. The United States Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of these state acts in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-
Distillers Corp.7 In Old Dearborn, the Illinois Fair Trade Act, which
was almost identical to the California act, was assailed as being violative
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.8 The Court upheld the Illinois act, thus establishing precedent for
state regulation in this area.
In 1937, Congress introduced further federal legislation by enacting
the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act.' This amendment
sanctioned vertical price-fixing agreements in interstate commerce and
allowed states to promulgate legislation under the protection of the act.
Included in the Florida act and in a majority of the state acts, was
a ''non-signer" provision.10 The purpose of this provision was to create
a cause of action for unfair competition against any business in the
state which, having notice of the fair trade contract between the seller
and any other merchant, knowingly sold the commodity at a price lower
than that stipulated in the contract. Thus, sellers who were not parties to
the contract but who had notice of the contract were bound by the price
set in the contract. The "non-signer" clauses resulted in extensive litiga-
tion. In twenty states the clause has been declared invalid on a variety
of grounds."1
3. Vertical Trade agreements are those made between the retailer and the manufacturer
or distributor.
4. Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
6. CAL. LAWS 1931, ch. 278, amended CAL. LAWS 1933, ch. 260.
7. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
8. Id. at 188.
9. This amendment is the first provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
10. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 541.07 (1969).
11. See e.g., Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d
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In 1951, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide the
constitutionality of the Louisiana "non-signer" clause in the landmark
case of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.2 The Court
held that the non-signer provisions of the state legislation fell under the
proscription of the Sherman Act and did not fall under the exception of
the Miller-Tydings Amendment.'3 The Court reasoned that if Congress
had desired to eliminate the consensual element required in fair trade
contracts by allowing one retailer to bind others by the use of a non-
signer clause, it could easily have included a non-signer provision." The
year after this decision Congress responded by adopting the McGuire
Act, which amended the Federal Trade Commission Act by adding a non-
signer provision. 5 The McGuire Act is an almost verbatim adaptation of
the California clause which had previously been upheld by the Supreme
Court.' 6
The passage of the McGuire Act was not accomplished without pro-
test or controversy. Among the opponents of the amendment was the
Federal Trade Commission. 7 The proponents of the bill argued that its
passage would result in lower prices for the consumers in those states
which enacted such a provision. The proponents also urged that fair
trade was beneficial to small business; and that the law was designed to
affect vertical trade channels, not horizontal, and, was therefore, no dif-
ferent than similar legal practices.' Businessmen further warned that
731 (1958); Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distill. Co., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949). See
also 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 6041.
12. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 390.
15. Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlaw-
ful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or right of action created by any
statute, law or public policy now in effect in any state, Territory, or the District
of Columbia, which in substance provides that willfully and knowingly advertising,
offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price of prices prescribed
in such contracts or agreements whether the person so offering for sale, or selling
is or is not a party to such a contract or agreement in unfair competition and is
actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.
15 U.S.C. § 45(3) (1964).
16. The Pep Boys of California v. Pyroil Sales, 299 U.S. 198 (1936).
17. Following is part of a letter written by James M. Mead, Chairman of the FTC to
Edwin C. Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
concerning the amendment:
The principal purpose of the proposed legislation is to overcome the effect of
the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Schwegmann case ...
The new principle introduced by this bill is that Congress shall specifically
approve the so-called non-signer clause. Thus, if the bill is enacted, a private con-
tract, the provisions of which would be determined without public hearing and
apart from any public supervision as to reasonableness, would be made binding on
all dealers and the consuming public.
The effect of adding the non-signer clause to resale price maintenance is the de
facto nullification of our Federal antitrust laws prohibiting horizontal conspiracy
to fix prices....
U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws, 2182 (1952).
18. Id. at 2192-94.
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price cutting was one of the strongest forces that could be used to develop
monopolies. Another group of supporters noted that such a law was "the
very essence of States Rights Legislation."'9
The McGuire Act gave congressional approval to the state non-
signer clauses already existing and extended their effect into the area of
interstate commerce. The Act has withstood constitutional attacks in
several of the federal courts of appeal2" and would undoubtedly be held
constitutional by the Supreme Court in light of its decisions upholding
essentially identical state statutes.21
III. THE FEDERAL RATIONALE FOR THE FAIR TRADE ACTS
The rationale supporting the constitutionality of fair trade legislation
is found in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.22
As indicated above, the particular question before the Court was the
constitutionality of the Illinois Fair Trade Act which included among its
terms a non-signer provision. The plaintiff, Seagram-Distillers Corpora-
tion, brought suit to enjoin Old Dearborn from selling liquor below the
prices agreed to in contracts made between Seagram and other retailers
in Illinois. Seagram argued that the result of the price cutting was a
diminution in sales by it to other retailers, and fewer sales by other re-
tailers to the public, during the price cutting period. Some retailers had
ceased to display Seagram's products and had notified Seagram that they
would not compete with Old Dearborn. They also informed Seagram that
they would discontinue handling Seagram's products until the price cut-
ting ceased. One of the retail contracts made pursuant to the act was
signed by the officers of Old Dearborn prior to the price cutting action.
Old Dearborn attacked the statute on two fronts, one of which was
that the act denied due process of law. The Court responded to this con-
tention by noting that the act is not "so arbitrary, unfair or wanting in
reason as to result in a denial of due process."28 The Court reasoned that
since Old Dearborn purchased only the commodity, it did not own the
trademark or goodwill of the company which the trademark symbolized.
24
The Court concluded that redressing any possible injury to the goodwill
of a product would be proper subject for legislation:
It is well settled that the proprietor of the goodwill is entitled to
protection as against one who attempts to deprive him of the
benefits resulting from the same, by using his labels and trade
mark without his consent and authority.25
19. Id.
20. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Health Cross Stores, Inc., 364 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1966);
Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Hess Bros., 243 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1957).
21. See Hudson Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Eli Lilly, 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
22. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
23. Id. at 194.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 194-95.
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Old Dearborn's second contention was that the act was violative of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. This argument was, in
essence, that the act conferred a privilege on the production and owner-
ship of goods identified by a trademark, brand, or name, while denying
the same privilege to unidentified goods. The Court rejected the argument
and held that the equal protection clause did not preclude a state from
resorting to reasonable classifications for the purpose of legislation.2"
The equal protection clause only requires that the classification "be rea-
sonable, not arbitrary, and ... rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'
As a result of the holdings in Old Dearborn, a large number of states
enacted fair trade laws patterned after the Illinois price maintenance
statute. Most of the acts included a non-signer clause. Presently, fair
trade contracts are enforceable against non-signers in 19 states and
against contracting parties in 39 states.28
IV. THE FLORIDA FAIR TRADE LAW: A CASE HISTORY
Since fair trade laws are enacted at the state level, the state may
within constitutional limits control the effect of the law on both intrastate
and interstate commerce. The effects of the Florida Fair Trade Act29
are typical: the existence of the act creates an almost schizophrenic atti-
tude among retailers, distributors and manufacturers. Retailers, distribu-
tors, manufacturers, and even lawyers still are not completely certain as
to the effect of the Florida act or, even more disturbing, whether the act
has any real vitality. For 31 years, the Florida courts have struggled
with the legislature and with manufacturers and retailers over the Florida
Act.8o
Florida statutes relating to price-fixing fall into three separate cate-
gories. The first category allows prices to be fixed by a board.,' The
second category relates to price-fixing agreements for a particular busi-
ness. 2 The third category includes the fair trade act which applies to all
trademarked and branded commodities.83 In cases involving all three
categories, the Florida Supreme Court has upheld price-fixing only in
26. Id. at 197.
27. Id.
28. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 1 6021 and 6041 contains a survey of the decisions on con-
stitutionality of fair trade legislation.
29. FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1969).
30. The first FLORIDA FAIn TRADE AcT was enacted in 1937 as Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18395.
31. E.g., Fla. Laws 1935 ch. 16799 (empowered a board of barber examiners to fix
minimum prices to be charged by barbers in Florida). This statute was held unconstitutional
in Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936).
32. E.g., Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 21001 (allowed for fair trade contracts and minimum
resale prices for liquor). This statute was held unconstitutional in Scarborough v. Webb's
Cut Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 8 So.2d 913 (1942).
33. FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1969).
1971]
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those cases where the delegation of the price-fixing power was effectuated
for a public purpose,"4 or in response to emergency conditions having an
adverse effect on the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 5
The history of fair trade in Florida has been rather stormy. In less
than two decades, three separate acts were promulgated and during the
same period all or part of each of the three acts were declared invalid or
unconstitutional.
In 1937, Florida enacted its first fair trade act in response to the
passage of the Miller-Tydings Amendment. 6 The Act included a non-
signer provision which became the subject of litigation in Bristol-Myers
Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., Inc.37 The trial court went further than
deciding the constitutionality of the non-signer provision. The court held
that the title of the Act was misleading and invalid under a Florida con-
stitutional provision requiring the subject matter of statutes to be briefly
expressed in the title.8" The Florida Supreme Court, in affirming the trial
court, concluded that there was nothing in the title of the act which would
put the public or members of the legislature on notice of the non-signer
clause included in the act and the novelty of such a provision, so contrary
to the common law, required that a warning be expressed in the title."
The constitutionality of the subsequent Fair Trade Act of 193910
was attacked in Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.4' The
factual situation, essentially analogous to Bristol-Myers,42 involved the
sale of liquor produced by Continental at prices below that set by con-
tracts entered into by other retailers. The Supreme Court of Florida con-
cluded that this legislation was not within the scope of the state's police
powers.48 Such legislation would be valid only if it applied to the general
public as distinguished from any member or class of the private sector.44
The court viewed the act as "a price-fixing statute" which operated to
vest the price-fixing power in individuals who were not public officials. 48
The court reached the conclusion that the Act was "arbitrary and un-
reasonable" and violated the right to own and enjoy property.4
34. E.g., Miami, Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759 (1938) (regulation of cleaning, dying, and laundry industry by authorized board
upheld as within public interest).
35. E.g., Miami Home Milk Prod. Ass'n v. Milk Control Bd., 124 Fla. 797, 169 So.
541 (1936).
36. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18395.
37. 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
38. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16 (1885).
39. 137 Fla. 508, 09, 188 So. 91, 92 (1939).
40. FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1941) (amended 1949).
41. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
42. 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
43. 40 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949).
44. Id. at 375.
45. Id. at 374. The court noted that "[tihe effect of this act is to grant by indirection
sovereign power to one person (not necessarily a citizen) to be exercised against another."
Id. at 374-75.
46. Id. at 375.
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Although the majority in Liquor Stores did not reflect on any of the
antitrust economics of the act, Justice Barnes in his concurring opinion
provided an in-depth examination of the effects of the Act on commerce.
Justice Barnes noted that to hold the Act valid would be to say that
horizontal agreements and contracts fixing prices or tending to stifle com-
petition are void, while at the same time, vertical agreements relating to
the same commodities are not only valid and binding on the parties who
execute them, but also apply to anyone advised or informed as to the price
fixed by the distributor."
As was the case in Bristol-Myers, only the validity of the non-signer
clause was before the court, but again the court took advantage of an
opportunity to strike down the entire act. Such action taken together with
the five-to-one majority decision certainly suggested a strong distaste for
the legislation.4"
Following the Liquor Stores decision the Fair Trade Act of 1949 was
enacted.49 The "new act" was merely a reenactment of the 1939 Act
preceded by certain "legislative findings of fact" that attempted to nullify
the dictum of Liquor Stores.50
Challenges to the new act were quick in coming. In 1951, Seagram-
Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc.51 raised the question of whether the
"findings or recitations of fact and declaration of necessity as to the
State's economic policy made by the legislature" incorporated in the new
act saved its constitutionality. The court noted that even though findings
of fact made by the legislature are presumptively correct, the findings
lose the presumption of validity "if they are obviously contrary to proven
and firmly established truths of which courts may take judicial notice."'
The court concluded its opinion by stating that "except for such so-called
findings of fact ... there is no material difference between said Act and
[the 1939 Act] ."3 Since the defendant was a non-signer, and inasmuch
as the United States Supreme Court had recently decided in Schwegmann
Brothers v. Calvert-Distillers Corp." that the interstate application of
non-signer clauses was invalid under federal legislation, the court based
its decision on these federal antitrust laws and found for the defendant.
Unfortunately, for the present laws, the court in Ben Greene,55 did
not specifically state that the 1949 Act was unconstitutional. If the specific
issue had been before the court, it would probably have invalidated the
47. Id. at 380-81.
48. See, Note, The Florida Fair Trade Act: Constitutional or Unconstitutional?, 2 U.
FLA. L. REv. 408 (1949).
49. Ch. 25204, Acts of 1949 (FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1949)).
50. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
51. 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
52. Id. at 236.
53. Id. at 236-37.
54. 341 US. 384 (1951).
55. 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
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Act. This conclusion is easily deduced from the dictum of the court.5" If,
as the court emphasized, the legislative findings did not save the Act, the
Act would still be unconstitutional.
The effect of the McGuire Act, which was passed in 1952 in response
to the Schwegmann Brothers case,57 was among the main issues before
the Florida Supreme Court in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd.5 8 The
court was asked whether the principles enumerated in Seagram-Distillers
Corp. v. Ben Greene59 and Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling
Corp.,60 declaring the non-signer clause unconstitutional, had been super-
seded by the McGuire Act."' The court pointed out that its decisions
interpreting the Constitution of the State of Florida were supreme and
"will not be overthrown by an act of Congress or the federal courts unless
some Federal Constitutional question is involved.18 2 The court, in un-
equivocal language, reemphasized its opposition to the entire act when
it said: "This Court has expressed its views on fair trade and similar
acts and has consistently and unequivocally rejected, on constitutional
grounds, both the underlying theory and the economic facts on which they
are sought to be predicated."68 Even though as with the Liquor Stores"4
decision, the controversy actually involved only the non-signer clause
(which again was held unconstitutional), the court nevertheless felt com-
pelled to comment on the "findings of fact," not a part of the non-signer
provision, saying: "Legislative 'findings of facts' as to the policy behind
the law, does not remove the lack of the 'yard stick standard.' "' The
clear implication of the court's language here, as in Ben Greene," is that
the entire act was unconstitutional.
On the same day that the court decided Miles Laboratories, it also
heard the case of Sterling Drug Inc. v. Eckerd's of Tampa.67 As in pre-
vious cases, the constitutionality of the non-signer clause was directly in
issue and, as before, the clause was declared invalid. Sterling Drugs and
Miles Laboratories68 are the most recent cases in this area decided by the
Florida Supreme Court.
Sunbeam Corp. v. Chase & Sherman, Inc., 9 decided by a Dade
County Circuit Court, in contrast to the litigation before the Florida
56. Id. at 236.
57. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
58. 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954). Noted, 9 MIAmI L.Q. 234 (1955).
59. 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
60. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 45(3) (1964).
62. 73 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 1954).
63. Id. The authority cited by the court for this statement included both the Liquor
Stores, 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949) and the Ben Greene, 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951) cases.
64. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
65. 73 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954).
66. 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
67. 71 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1954).
68. 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
69. 1953 Trade Cas. 67,524 (Dade Co., Fla. Cir. Ct.).
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Supreme Court, involved a contract which had been signed by the defen-
dant. All retailers dealing with Sunbeam were required to sign similar
contracts. Chase & Sherman, Inc. violated its contract by selling below
the contract price despite warnings by Sunbeam. Sunbeam finally brought
suit for an injunction against the violations. The constitutionality of the
entire act was put in issue. The trial judge, citing Old Dearborn Distribut-
ing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.70 held that "the Florida Fair Trade
Act does not offend the Federal Constitution. ' 71 In reply to defendant's
contention that the Florida Supreme Court had previously declared the
act unconstitutional, the judge noted that "the unconstitutionality of the
second Florida Fair Trade Act72 ... has never been passed upon by the
Supreme Court. ' 7 ' The court further stated that
the only concern Florida has is (1) that no manufacturer shall
eliminate all its competitors so that our citizens have no other
choice, or (2) that the manufacturers shall not conspire or
horizontally contract with each other and agree to charge the
same price so that our citizens have to pay a monopoly price.74
The trial court then entered a preliminary restraining order against the
defendant.
Chase & Sherman is the only Florida case upholding the constitu-
tionality of any of the Florida acts. Despite the apparent significance of
this case certiorari was denied by the Florida Supreme Court during the
January 1954 term (the same term it decided Sterling Drugs and Miles
Laboratories) .71 The denial may have been the result of the fact that the
court already had before it two cases dealing with the same subject matter.
Even though both Sterling Drugs70 and Miles Laboratories7 related to
non-signer clause situations, the court, as evidenced by its discussion in
Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Co.,78 could have upheld the
constitutionality of the remainder of the act. Instead, as noted above,
the Florida Supreme Court chose in Miles Laboratories79 to re-emphasize
its opposition to the idea of fair trade acts.
In 1955, the federal and state courts rendered decisions which added
to the uncertainty surrounding the validity of the 1949 Act. The Circuit
Court of Dade County again upheld the Act (except for the non-signer
clause) .0 On the federal level, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
70. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
71. 1953 Trade Cas. 67,524 (Dade Co., Fla. Cir. Ct.).
72. FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1941) (amended 1949).
73. 1953 Trade Cas. 67,524 (Dade Co., Fla. Cir. Ct.).
74. Id.
75. 73 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1954).
76. 71 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1954).
77. 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
78. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
79. 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
80. Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Rayvis, 1955 Trade Cas. 68,051.
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was asked to decide the constitutionality of the entire act in Sunbeam
Corp. v. Masters of Miami."' Sunbeam argued that the Florida Supreme
Court had retreated from its "consistent and unequivocal" opposition on
constitutional grounds to the fair trade act by denying certiorari without
opinion in the Chase & Sherman case. 2 The court of appeals pointed out
that this was not really a retreat inasmuch as the contract in Chase &
Sherman was enforced only inter partes8 3 Sunbeam also contended that
the defendant retailer was guilty of an intentional interference with con-
tract by inducing contract signers to breach the contract provisions by
selling fair traded items to the defendant below the contract price. 4 The
court also rejected this argument. Commenting on the later Dade County
Circuit Court decision, 5 the federal court stated that in its view the
discussion by the circuit court was entirely contrary to the rule of public
policy set out in case after case by the Florida Supreme Court."
Based on the authority of Master's of Miami,"' in 1955 it was reason-
able to conclude that the Florida Fair Trade Act of 1949 was unconstitu-
tional. If that were the case, all federal antitrust legislation would have
been in full force. This determination precipitated the litigation in Miami
Parts & Spring, Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co."8 in which plaintiff
alleged violations of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman
and Sherman Acts. In holding for the defendant, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed its decision in Master's of Miami" and, in so doing, threw the
question of the constitutionality of the fair trade act back into a state of
turmoil. The reversal was based on the misinterpretation of the denial of
certiorari by the court in Chase & Sherman.90 In Master's of Miami9 the
court had construed the denial of certiorari as having no implication as to
the merits of the case, and accordingly, the federal court was not required
to regard the circuit court decision as the ruling law of Florida.9' The
federal court in the Miami Parts & Spring case re-examined the question
of what effect, as precedent, the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court
of Florida would have. It concluded that its earlier decision as to the
effect of denial of certiorari had been contrary to the holdings of the
Florida Supreme Court. Pursuant to this re-examination, the court read
the Florida law on the effect of a denial of certiorari under Rule 3493 to
81. 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955).
82. 1953 Trade Cas. 67,524 (Dade Co., Fla. Cir. Ct.).
83. 225 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1955).
84. Id. at 196.
85. Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Rayvis, 1955 Trade Cas. 68,051.
86. 225 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1955).
87. 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955).
88. 364 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1966).
89. 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955).
90. 1953 Trade Cas. 67,524 (Dade Co., Fla. Cir. Ct.).
91. 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955).
92. Id. at 196.




be an adjudication on the merits." Consequently, the court concluded
that it should follow the Dade County Circuit Court and hold the fair
trade act, without the non-signer clause, constitutional and effectual. 5
In 1968, the Fifth Circuit emphasized its decision in Miami Parts &
Spring96 by expressly upholding the constitutionality of the Florida act.
T
V. Is THE FLORIDA FAIR TRADE ACT OF 1949 UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Despite all of the litigation and case law involving the Florida Fair
Trade Act the question of its constitutionality under the Florida Constitu-
tion remains unanswered. The federal decisions have held the act consti-
tutional. On the other hand, the pronouncements of the Florida Supreme
Court undeniably express a view that the entire Act is invalid and void.
The dicta in Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc.9" and in Miles
Laboratories v. Eckerd99 suggest that the Florida Supreme Court would
have held the act unconstitutional; moreover, the language of these cases
at least implies this position to be the law of Florida.
In Miami Parts & Spring'00 the court concluded that the denial of
certiorari under Rule 34 was an affirmance of the lower court decision.
Under Rule 34, certiorari could be granted to a decree in chancery. How-
ever, since in Sunbeam v. Chase & Sherman, Inc."1 the issue was not the
constitutionality of the fair trade act, but whether a restraining order
should have been issued by the court, a denial of certiorari should have
only the effect of upholding the granting of the temporary order. It does
not follow that the denial of certiorari is a concurrence in any other find-
ings made by the court.
The "rule certiorari" procedure is only designed to expedite and
simplify appellate review of decrees in chancery.Y02 Moreover, the general
rule provides that where an appeal is available, certiorari does not lie,
and it cannot be used in lieu of an appeal. 03 As evidenced by several of
the related state cases discussed above, appeal was available.1'0 It is
entirely conceivable that the federal court in Miami Parts & Spring once
again misinterpreted the Florida law as to the effect of the denial of
certiorari. 0 5
Even assuming that the Fifth Circuit correctly applied Florida law
94. 364 F.2d 957, 966 (5th Cir. 1966).
95. Id. at 967.
96. 364 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1966).
97. 404 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1968).
98. 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
99. 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
100. 364 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1966).
101. 1953 Trade Cas. 67,524 (Dade Co., Fla. Cir. Ct.).
102. 5 FLA. JuR. Certiorari § 38 (1955).
103. 5 FLA. JuR. Certiorari § 5 (1955).
104. Seagram-Distill. Corp. v. Ben Greene, 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951), was an appeal
from the circuit court to the Florida Supreme Court.
105. 364 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1966).
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to the certiorari issue, an equally important question is "what weight
should have been given to the circuit court decision?" In the recent case
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bosch,10 the United States
Supreme Court, following the rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Thomp-
kins,1°7 stated that "while decrees of 'lower state courts' should be 'at-
tributed some weight.., the decision [is] not controlling.. .' where the
highest court of the State has not spoken on the point." 08 The Bosch
court also pointed out that:
An intermediate appellate state court .. is a datum for ascer-
taining state law which is not to be disregarded by the federal
court unless it is convinced by the other persuasive data that
the highest court of the state would decide otherwise . .."
The Court's references were to cases which had been decided prior to the
date that the Fifth Circuit decided Master's of Miami.
The above becomes particularly interesting in light of a statement
by the circuit court in Chase & Sherman11° to the effect that
[I] t is clear that no appellate decision on the constitutionality of
the present Florida Fair Trade Act, binding on this court, is
now in existence. Nor have the courts of this state ever been
called upon to determine the validity of our Fair Trade Act with
respect to a signed contract.
This language, coupled with the statements by the United States Supreme
Court in Bosch, suggest that the circuit court dictum upholding the
constitutionality of the Florida act was not controlling, but merely per-
suasive in an action in a federal court. As indicated above, the decisions
of the Florida Supreme Court are also persuasive indications that the
court would have held the Act unconstitutional. The United States Su-
preme Court's language seems to instruct other federal courts to follow the
persuasive dicta from the highest court when the only other authority is
a decision of a lower appellate court. Therefore, it is debatable whether
the court of appeals should have reached the decision that it did with
respect to the Florida law.
VI. ACTION BY RETAILERS AND CONSUMERS
The practical effect of the uncertainty surrounding the Florida Fair
Trade Act of 1949 on retailers and consumers is substantial. A limited
survey"' of the merchants in the state revealed several contracts were
106. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
107. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
108. 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. 1953 Trade Cas. 67,524 (Dade Co., Fla. Cir. Ct.).
111. The survey was made in 1970 by the author, who, by telephone, contacted various
Florida merchants and questioned them as to the effect of the fair trade act.
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made pursuant to the Fair Trade Act. Several merchants indicated that
without the contract goods would be sold below the retail price set by the
manufacturer. Other merchants expressed the view that the manufacturers
who used the contracts were aware of the possible invalidity of the con-
tracts. However, in all cases the retailer signed the contract in order to
receive the merchandise.
For the consumer, the contracts can only mean higher prices. The
contracts eliminate competition and the lower prices which result there-
from.
Until further litigation occurs, the law of Florida appears to uphold
fair trade contracts. Since both the retailer and the consumer are ad-
versely affected by the law, either would have standing to test its validity.
The retailer could easily precipitate a lawsuit by selling goods at a price
below that set in his contract with the manufacturer. However, most
manufacturers who supply Florida merchants with durable goods are from
out of the state. If litigation were to develop over a contract, if there
were diversity of citizenship between the parties, and if the jurisdictional
amount were met, the manufacturer could remove the case to the federal
courts where the Act would conceivably be upheld. 2
If the retailer were to bring a suit alleging that the contract violated
the federal antitrust laws, not only would the manufacturer probably
seek removal of the case based upon the federal question involved," 8 but
the retailer could expect to lose his franchise to sell the goods covered by
the contract as a result of retaliation by the manufacturer.
Another alternative for the retailer would be to bring an action under
Florida Statutes Section 542.05 (1969), which is the state counterpart to
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Florida Statutes Section 542.10 (1969)
declares that any contract made in violation of any provision of Chapter
542 is void. Any adjudication of the validity of the contract would neces-
sitate a decision as to the constitutionality of the Fair Trade Act (Florida
Statute Ch. 541 et seq.) since Florida Statutes Section 542.05 (5) (a)
(1969) makes an exception for any contract made pursuant to Chapter
541.
The consumer also has an opportunity to initiate inquiry in this
area. Under the Florida Declaratory Judgment Act,"
4
Any person claiming to be interested or ... whose rights, status
or other equitable or legal relations are affected by a statute ...
may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under such statute.., and obtain a declaration of rights,
status or other equitable or legal relations thereunder.
The consumer, as a person who is certainly "interested" in the validity
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
114. FA. STAT. § 86.021 (1969).
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of the Fair Trade Act and who is primarily affected by the relations be-
tween the parties to the contracts made pursuant to the fair trade laws,
undoubtedly would be within the class contemplated by the statute." 5
Under the declaratory judgment procedure, the question of constitution-
ality would be appealable to the Florida Supreme Court, where, the
validity of the fair trade act would finally be determined.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Florida Fair Trade Act of 1949 has had an interesting, although
somewhat volatile existence. After 15 years of uncertainty, the Act re-
mains in the Florida Statutes. It is unfortunate that such a far-reaching
law should continue to exist only because the federal courts insist that
the Florida law is other than what the Florida Supreme Court appears to
think it is. The only apparent solution is for the interested parties to have
the constitutionality of the law decided by the Florida Supreme Court
through one means or another. Any forthcoming litigation can only help
the consumer. The longer the public waits, the more it will cost.
115. Although there have been no Florida cases under the Declaratory Judgment Act
which have dealt with consumers, there is authority for a declaratory judgment proceeding
being brought to adjudicate the validity of a statute. Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term
Grand Jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952).
